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BOOK REVIEW

MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE.

Martha Minow.t Ithaca, New York:

Cornell University Press, 1990. Pp. vii, 403. $29.95.
Reviewed by Judith G. McMullen*
Some theorists of language and human knowledge speculate that placing
people and things in categories is an essential step in the process by which
any individual makes sense of the world. Without categories of experience
and categories of language with which to express them, experience of the
world would be chaotic and overwhelming. Categories allow us to organize
and apply past experiences to present situations. Theorists believe, therefore, that categories are an indispensable part of human cognition.
It is one thing to recognize the necessity of categorical analysis in general, but quite another to presume that the categories currently in use in
American law and society are themselves inevitable or necessary. In her
recent book, Making All the Difference, Martha Minow takes a critical look
at the way law and society impose rigid categorizations, categorizations
which themselves dictate certain predictable consequences.
Minow first examines what she calls the dilemma of difference: The
problem that arises when we label people as different in order to compensate for the adverse consequences of their difference. But the very label of
"different" exacerbates the adverse consequences of this difference. For instance, the label "handicapped" will make a child eligible for all sorts of
special educational programs, but that same label also carries a stigma from
which various negative consequences flow. In addition, it is often unclear
what we are trying to accomplish with special treatment. If we are trying to
achieve equality among groups, do we mean equality of treatment or equality of result? Minow uses the example of gender difference in the distribution of property after divorce (pp. 40-41). Equal distribution of property
does not recognize the greater economic needs of women with custody of
children, nor does it recognize the overwhelmingly lower earning power of
women as a group.1 However, awarding more property or support to wo1' Professor of Law, Harvard University. She received her J.D. degree from Yale University
Law School and has served as law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Lenore Weitzman has suggested that the standard of living for women and children drops
73% following a divorce, compared to a 42% rise in the standard of living for their former hus-
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men following a divorce tends to reinforce negative stereotypes of women as
being needy and dependent on men. The dilemma of difference is the law's
dilemma about how to ameliorate unfair consequences to the powerless
without further reducing their power.
Minow maintains that there are some very strong and potentially dangerous assumptions lurking in the legal analysis of differences. She explores
five such assumptions in Chapter 2.
First, she says the law treats differences as intrinsic rather than acknowledging that differences are relative. Deafness makes a person "different" from hearing people, but does not distinguish him from other deaf
people. Moreover, it makes no sense to assert that a person is different from
himself. He must be different from somebody else.
Second, Minow's point deals with the norm implicit in this assessment
of difference. If deaf is different, then hearing must be the norm. Minow
argues that the law operates on the assumption that the norm need not be
stated. Of course, one reason not to state a norm is that it is obvious, but
that is not what Minow means. She argues that the very selection of a norm
is a deliberate decision, and the failure to state the norm only disguises that
decision and denies responsibility for its effects. Minow claims that the law
responds as if the chosen difference and norm were somehow inevitable and
dictated by objective facts, rather than by a subjective ordering of priorities
and expectations.
Third, the law assumes that the observer of any given situation can see
without a particular perspective. Minow questions how anyone could ever
completely step away from his own unique perspective, because one's perspective is determined by everything one knows and has experienced. Even
if one could take on another person's perspective, which is questionable, he
would have to have some situated perspective. It is impossible to conceive
of a person having no starting assumptions, no self-interests, and no past
experiences by which to judge the meaning of present experience.
Fourth, Minow argues that the law essentially ignores any other perspectives, including (maybe, especially) the perspective of the person who is
being characterized as different.
Finally, Minow says that the law operates on the presumption that the
status quo is "natural, uncoerced, and good." (p. 70). In other words, the
law's categories of differences and the results flowing therefrom are simply
in the nature of things. We have no choice but to recognize certain differences (or so the argument goes), and it would be contrary to nature to debands.

LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA xii (1985).
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sign a system which interfered with the natural consequences of those
differences.
Minow devotes the rest of the book to examining these assumptions and
possible alternatives to them. In Chapter 3, she suggests that instead of
regarding differences as intrinsic to the different person, we could understand differences "as a function of relationships." (p. 80). This may introduce more flexibility when we are trying to solve specific problems. For
example, as long as we view a deaf child as "different," our efforts to educate him will focus on "fixing" his handicap or accommodating the system
designed for "normal" children in order to meet the deaf child's needs.
When we recharacterize the issue as a problem in facilitating a relationship
between the deaf child and hearinl children, or between the deaf child and
teachers, our new approach enables us to do more creative problem solving.
Minow suggests that classes could be conducted both in sign language and
in spoken language with the result that both would be considered normal
and expected, and no one would be "different."
Moreover, in Chapter 3 Minow suggests that looking at differences as a
"function of relationships" rather than as traits intrinsic to a particular individual is one way out of the difference dilemma. She also points out that
there are varying perspectives on the effects of being categorized as different. A difference could be a point of pride or a chance for special privileges
and opportunites. On the other hand, it could be a source of stigma or a
way of placing responsibility for the difference and its effects on the different person.
Part II of the book examines with painstaking thoroughness the historical roots of the way the law treats differences. Minow discusses approaches
which focus on rights, social relations, or assumptions that some persons
are abnormal. She compares, contrasts, and integrates these theories. She
also discusses these theories in the context of cases, as well as disciplines
such as literature, psychology, and feminist theory. Minow demonstrates
an impressive ability to reflect on a wide range of ideas about perspective
and the treatment of difference.
Finally, in Part III Minow suggests an approach which combines an
emphasis on individual rights and differences with a focus on solving
problems within the context of relationships. While the effort to meld
rights with relationships is largely theoretical, Minow does examine some of
the practical ramifications of her suggestions in the context of medical treatment of severely disabled newborns.
Overall, this book is creative and thoroughly researched, although it
often lacks a certain practicality. Some of Minow's most interesting ideas
have to do with the ways she challenges the five basic assumptions about
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difference that she attributes to the law. I want to specifically examine Minow's core assertion that differences are a comparison between a deliberately, sometimes arbitrarily, chosen "norm" and a "different" person,
rather than characteristics intrinsic to the "different" person. If, for example, we compare deaf children to hearing children without using hearing
children as the norm, we see that our issue becomes one of establishing a
common language. We can then use both sign language and spoken language to assure communication among all of the children as Minow
suggests.
Minow's point that certain differences become relevant in society because we single them out and use them for comparison is well taken. If
everyone had blue eyes or black skin or was the same gender, then we
would presume these characteristics as automatically as we presume that
each living person has a head. It would make no sense to base differential
treatment on traits shared by everybody. Moreover, even where all people
do not share a particular trait, there is a distinct arbitrariness to choosing
certain traits over others as the basis for any kind of differential treatment,
at least in the abstract. Why should political status, economic position, or
educational opportunity depend any more on race than it does on, say, eye
color?
The initial decision by someone eons ago to make race outcome determinative is an example of an assignment of value to a trait, where such
assignment became entrenched in the society. Since race has dictated certain past legal results it is similarly possible today that race can still possibly
influence theoretically irrelevant decisions. Specifically, should present society use race as a decision-influencing factor in an attempt to redress the
past inappropriate use of that factor in apportioning rights? This brings us
squarely up against what Minow calls the difference dilemma.
In Chapter 4, Minow details three distinct theoretical approaches to difference: the abnormal persons approach, the rights-analysis approach, and
the social relations approach. She is clearly not impressed with the abnormal persons approach in which "assertions about a person's basic or immutable nature locate him or her [in the normal class or in the abnormal
class]." (p. 106). This classification results in different legal treatments.
She is more receptive to the rights-analysis approach, which "inspires a
skepticism about the accuracy of particular assumptions and classifications
of difference. Attributions of difference have so often been faulty, expressions only of prejudice and power, that they must be subjected to intense
scrutiny." (p. 107). If true intrinsic differences are found, then a denial of
rights may be justified, but it will be based on evidence rather than on prejudice. Minow is concerned that this theory still rests upon an unstated norm
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and "retains a general presumption that differences reside in the different
person rather than in relation to norms embedded in prevailing institutions." (p. 108).
Although she recognizes many of its limitations (SEE Chapter 8), Minow seems to be, on the whole, more impressed with the social relations
approach, which "demands analysis of difference in terms of the relationships that construct it." (p. 112). This approach acknowledges that the assignment of the label of difference is an act of power. "The name of
difference is produced by those with the power to name and the power to
treat themselves as the norm. Though the difference does not reside in any
one person, the comparison is drawn by some to distinguish themselves
from others." (p. 111).
Minow discusses many examples of the social relations approach.
Among them are the writings of Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing. They have
characterized mental illness as a relative concept whereby the more powerful "sane" distinguish themselves from the insane by defining sanity in
terms of themselves.
One of Minow's main objectives is to make us realize that many bases
for assigning goods and rights in society were originally founded on initial
determinations to consider one trait the norm and all others abnormal. On
a theoretical level, we can claim that all "norms" and "differences" are chosen by power-holders to further their own power, rather than to pursue the
norms which were somehow originally logical or necessary. By playing
with our assumptions, we can do some very creative problem solving. For
example, if we considered women the norm rather than men, blind people
the norm rather than sighted people, or psychotic persons the norm rather
than non-psychotic persons, we would have a differently structured society.
"Perceptions and assessments of difference pick out the traits that do
not fit comfortably within dominant social arrangements," says Minow,
"even when those traits could easily be made irrelevant by different social
arrangements of different rules about what traits should be allowed to matter." (p. 55). While acknowledging that members of the dominant social
arrangements hold the power, this statement leaves open the possibility that
some traits must matter in a society and that some traits could be more
easily made irrelevant than others. Minow chooses not to emphasize the
latter point. At times it is unclear whether Minow intends to make this
point at all. While it is theoretically possible to alter the dominant social
arrangements such that any trait would no longer matter, I question
whether this concept is useful or practical.
If we step away from theory just a little and assume only that human
beings are partially defined and their potentiality largely determined by the
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fact that they interact and survive within some kind of society, then the
decision to establish certain norms is no longer only an act of dominance by
the more powerful among us. At the extreme, someone who is catatonic or
acutely psychotic is "different" in the sense that he cannot meaningfully
participate in the sort of social interactions that lead to physical survival
and emotional fulfillment. It is possible to posit a society where such a
person were the norm, or where his "difference" would not matter, but it
would not be a society in a useful sense of that term. On the occasions
when I have encountered the psychotic man who sleeps on the park bench
across from the law school, I have not found claims that sanity and insanity
are merely norms assigned by the powerful to be useful. It seems ridiculous
to attribute this man's diminished opportunities to a decision to compare
him with a potentially alterable norm. There is indeed something intrinsic
in him which prevents him from interacting in anything which we would
characterize as society. It makes no real sense to view this as a problem of
comparisons or relationships when there is indeed a characteristic, or group
of them, which makes entry into almost any relationship impossible for this
person.
I also question Minow's implication that it is adults and their categorizations which single out a child as different in a school or other peer setting.
As the mother of two children, I have often been shocked by the quickness,
sureness, and rigidity of preschool and young school age children's categorizations of their peers. On one occasion, I recall returning home with my
children from a visit at the home of friends who have a special needs child.
"What's wrong with him?" my six year old daughter asked during the ride
home. I explained that nothing was "wrong" with him, that every child is
different, and that some people find some things like language to be harder
to learn. My daughter responded, "Oh, I get it. He isn't as smart as other
kids, just like Johnny Doe who has to repeat kindergarten." (Johnny Doe is
a learning disabled child at my daughter's school.) We discussed how
Johnny is in a situation that is especially hard for him, but that he has
abilities that would allow him to do better in some situations than other
children. My daughter was polite, but written all over her face was a look
which said, "Mommy isn't as smart as other moms. She just doesn't understand about Johnny."
This is not mere childish cruelty. My daughter recognizes these children as being different soley because they cannot, or at least have not so far,
been able to perform many of the developmental tasks through which one
learns to cope effectively in society. At certain levels, society is rigid and
arbitrary and should change its requirements for coping instead of always
requiring individuals to change themselves. At some point, however, an

1991]

MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE

individual is not excluded by the label of "different" as much as the label of
"different" is descriptive of a trait which makes it impossible or extraordinarily difficult for that individual to participate in certain social relations at
all. We can argue about where to draw the line between functional and
dysfunctional persons, but it is counterintuitive to assert that we must never
draw a line at all. My daughter was labeling another child as different, not
so she could claim power and superiority over him, but because her six year
old instincts told her that this child had to deal with the difficult problem of
not being able to fit in and accomplish certain things within the range of
what the rest of his peers could do.
Society, in my view, should not hold certain differences as potential
norms because to do so would be to tolerate the causes of those differences.
I am thinking of a book in which Morton Schatzman discusses the life of
Judge Schreber, a nineteenth century paranoid schizophrenic of some repute.2 The author presents a convincing case that delusions induced by
Schreber's illness made sense when considered in the light of his abusive
early home environment. His bizarre and psychotic behavior and specific
delusions could be viewed as an attempt to cope with his sadistic father and
the dysfunctional household his father commanded. In other words, the
behavior made sense in terms of the context in which it was learned, but
appeared to be completely irrational when judged according to the norms of
larger society. Specifically, the author links Schreber's delusions of thought
control and physical punishments to certain disciplinary techniques of his
father which could be fairly characterized as brainwashing. Thus,
Schreber's behavior could be considered a norm, but only in a hellish environment. Although there may be a social relations problem here, it is not
so much between Schreber and society as it is between Schreber and his
internalized father. If society adapts too fully to Schreber's dysfunction, it
makes it all the easier for sadistic parents to operate in this society.
Schreber's case is extreme and somewhat sensational, but in fact we encounter the same problem whenever we deal with a child who is the product
of an abusive, dysfunctional, or poverty-stricken environment. We do not
want to dismiss children as hopeless because of environmentally induced
handicaps. However, we must recognize that some individuals have traits
(whatever their cause) which will hinder or prevent any kind of meaningful
relationship within society. Of course, recognizing such traits must in no
way imply that the person having such a trait is somehow at fault.
Minow seems reluctant to admit that some labels of difference and some
norms are essential in society. She may be disturbed by the ease with which
2.

MORTON SCHATZMAN, SOUL MURDER

(1973).
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we assume that existing norms are essential. She may also be concerned
with our readiness to blame those who differ from the norm for their differences and to shift the entire burden of overcoming their differences upon
those persons.
Denying people with blue eyes the right to vote would be ludicrous, but
denying this right to someone who is catatonic and unresponsive is necessary. Denying black people the right to vote should be equally laughable as
denying it to the blue-eyed person. However, some in the past have claimed
that it was as necessary as disenfranchising the catatonic, because skin color
may be correlated with illiteracy. Illiteracy may be correlated with the inability to respond to a ballot, and the inability to respond to a ballot is the
underlying reason we would not let the catatonic vote. This is a horrible
slippery slope, and if we slide down it, we can justify almost any norm as
necessary, which is exactly what Minow says the law often does and should
not do any more.
If this book claims that all categories and norms are arbitrarily chosen,
comparisons which could be made irrelevant by changing the socio-legal
structures, then it is naive. On the other hand, if the book is meant to jolt
us out of our complacent acceptance of all implicit norms as necessary, then
it is insightful. I prefer to think that it is the latter.

